This paper proposes a framework to model household decision making on participation (or not) in cash transfer programs depending on whether a conditionality exists. The paper outlines the optimal size of the cash transfer such that a fixed government budget maximizes the poverty reduction.
The social assistance and subjective well-being literature frequently shows “stigma” and “disempowerment” effects accompanying government transfers. These studies posit that the bureaucratic processes of government income assistance programs generate feelings of shame among recipients and adversely impacts their selfassessed well-being; or that being the “passive recipient” of state assistance undermines an individual’s sense of empowerment. We examine whether this theory holds under conditions of extreme instability and conflict.
This paper estimates urban and rural poverty rates across five Chinese administrative regions (Shanghai, Liaoning, Guangdong, Henan and Gansu) in 2014 using representative household level data from the China Family Panel Studies survey. The types of government transfer payments that households in poverty received and the ability for such payments to lift households from poverty are also assessed. Consistent with official estimates, the results highlight substantial disparities in poverty rates between administrative regions.